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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JARED C. KACSUTA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 950077-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JTTRISDICTJON AND flAT?RE QF PEQCEEDINSS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) , 
-8(5) (a) (ix) and (x), -8(5) (c) (Supp. 1995), in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court, in and for Beaver County, the Honorable 
J. Philip Eves, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)(Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did defendant's trial counsel render effective 
assistance of counsel? Whether a defendant has received 
ineffective assistance of counsel is reviewed as a question of 
law when raised for the first time on direct review, State v. 
Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah App. 1993); however, "appellate 
review of counsel's performance must be highly deferential." Id. 
at 466. 
2. Did the trial court correctly find that testimony 
concerning defendant's prior drug distribution activities was 
admissible for the limited purpose of showing his intent on the 
evening of his arrest? uThe admission of evidence under Rule 
404 is a question of law that [the appellate court] review[s] for 
correctness." State v. Olsen. 869 P.2d 1004, 1009 (Utah App. 
1994). n*However, the trial court's subsidiary factual 
determinations should be given deference by the appellate court 
and only be overruled if they are clearly erroneous."' Id. 
(quoting State v. O'Neil. 848 P.2d 694, 698-99 (Utah App. 1993), 
pert, (tenied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993)). 
3. Should the Court consider defendant's claim that there 
was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict when he 
failed to marshal the evidence? Failure to marshal the evidence 
waives an appellant's right to have his claim of insufficiency 
considered on appeal. State v. Mincy. 838 P.2d 648, 652 n.l 
(Utah App.), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). 
4. Should this Court consider defendant's claim that the 
trial court erroneously denied his motion to reduce his sentence? 
The appellate court will assume the correctness of a lower court 
ruling in the absence of any meaningful record. State v. Garza. 
820 P.2d 937, 938-39 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 516 
(Utah 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Constitutional provisions, statutes and rules pertinent to 
the determination of the issues on appeal are attached at 
Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute (Count I), a second degree 
felony, and possession of a controlled substance, a class A 
misdemeanor (R. 1-2). Defendant moved to suppress evidence (R. 
81-82; T. 56). Following a jury trial, on June 22, 1994, 
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defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute (T. 170). The trial court sentenced 
defendant to a term of one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison (R. 153). 
STATEMENT QF THE FACTS 
At the time of his arrest, defendant was under the parole 
supervision of Rodney E. Seymour of Adult Probation and Parole 
(AP&P) (T. 68-69) . Defendant had not reported as required to 
Officer Seymour for approximately a month and a half despite 
several messages being left at defendant's residence (T. 69). On 
March 17, 1994, Officer Seymour and another AP&P agent went to 
Beaver "with the specific reason to arrest Jared Kacsuta for a 
parole violation" (T. 70). 
The officers arrived at defendant's apartment, located 
across the street from the high school, about 5:20 in the evening 
(T. 70) -1 They knocked on defendant's door, identified 
themselves and said they wanted to talk to defendant (T. 70-71) . 
Defendant opened the door and Officer Seymour stepped into the 
apartment (T. 71). There they discovered six other young men, 
four of whom were juveniles, and defendant's brother, Jason 
Kacsuta, all grouped closely together (T. 71, 122). 
Officer Seymour conducted a pat-down search of defendant and 
found in defendant's pockets $58 and three baggies of marijuana, 
containing 5.2 grams, 2.8 grams and 0.4 grams, respectively, 
enough to make about thirty-three marijuana cigarettes (T. 72, 
1
 Additional testimony established that the corner of the 
high school was 277 feet from defendant's apartment (T. 99). 
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74, 83, 86). Defendant was arrested, handcuffed and transported 
to the Beaver County Sheriff's Office (T. 72-75). 
Officer Seymour informed the Sheriff's Office that they had 
found the marijuana on defendant and that there had been 
juveniles in the apartment at the time of the arrest (T. 94). 
Officer Russell Erickson of the Beaver City Police Department was 
aware of an outstanding arrest warrant for defendant's brother 
Jason Kacsuta (T. 94). Officer Erickson and Officer Cameron Noel 
went to defendant's apartment to arrest defendant's brother (T. 
94). Officer Noel noticed a lot of tobacco smoke and open 
containers of alcohol, and believed he smelled stale marijuana 
smoke (T. 109-110). Officers Erickson and Noel ordered all of 
the juveniles out of the apartment, locked the apartment and 
transported defendant's brother back to the police station (T. 
95). In transit the officers talked with Jason and became 
suspicious that there were other controlled substances in the 
apartment (T. 94-95). 
Back at the Sheriff's Office, Officer Erickson asked for and 
received defendant's permission to search the apartment (T. 96). 
Defendant signed a "Permission to Search" form (T. 96). The 
apartment was then searched and various items of drug 
paraphernalia were found including a pocket knife with marijuana 
residue, a marijuana pipe, marijuana seeds and stems, pipe 
screens, scales and a roach clip (T. 96). 
Officer Erickson, trained at the police academy on visual 
identification of marijuana, testified that in his experience the 
scales found in defendant's apartment would most commonly belong 
to the seller, rather than the buyer of drugs, and that, because 
all the paraphernalia was found in a bag in defendant's closet, 
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he did not think the paraphernalia belonged to one of defendant's 
visitors (T. 96-98, 104-105). 
Ronald James, defendant's landlord, testified that he was 
having trouble with defendant's having too many people in the 
apartment (T. 89, 91). Jason Greenwood, one of defendant's 
neighbors, had complained several times to James about many 
people coming and going from defendant's apartment at all hours 
of the night (T. 115-17). Within a month before defendant's 
arrest Greenwood could smell marijuana in the stairwells and the 
halls: "Sometimes it would come through the vents, and you could 
smell it. Anytime you walked up the stairs . . . you could smell 
it as you walked up" (T. 118). 
Prior to trial, the court conducted a suppression hearing 
concerning the admissibility of three State witnesses who would 
testify that they used or purchased marijuana from the defendant 
before his arrest (T. 3 9-57). After extensive argument, the 
court allowed the testimony as evidence of defendant's intent to 
distribute under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence (T. 56). 
At trial the court gave an extensive cautionary instruction 
to the jury that the testimony from the three witnesses pertained 
only to defendant's intent, and was not relevant for any other 
purpose (T. 123). The first witness was Cody Beaumont, a 
seventeen-year-old, who was present when defendant was arrested 
(T. 120-21). He testified that one week prior to defendant's 
arrest defendant had given him marijuana and they had smoked it 
in Cody's truck (T. 124). Cody further testified that defendant 
had "occasionally" given him marijuana prior to defendant's 
arrest (T. 124). The second witness, Jerry Perez testified that 
he and defendant had smoked marijuana at Mr. Perez's house (T. 
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128). Mr. Perez further testified that in the beginning of March 
he and defendant had smoked defendant's marijuana at work (T. 
130). The third witness, Scott Clemmons, testified that at the 
beginning of February he purchased $3 0 or $4 0 of marijuana from 
the defendant (T. 132-33). 
The State's final witness was Raymond Goodwin, a twenty-year 
veteran Utah police officer in the Beaver County Sheriff's Office 
with specialized training in the trafficking of controlled 
substances. He testified that the presence of three baggies of 
marijuana on defendant indicated drug trafficking (T. 135-36). 
He also stated that it is common to find drug distributors with 
scales, which usually belong to the seller rather than the buyer 
(T. 140). He concluded that all the evidence presented was 
characteristic of drug distribution (T. 141). 
Defendant called no witnesses. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Defendant's fails to show through his multifarious claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel that his counsel acted 
deficiently or that he was prejudiced. Defendant supplies no 
record evidence that witnesses he claims his counsel should have 
called to testify would have aided his case or that counsel did 
not deliberately reject them. Defendant's challenge to counsel's 
refusal to object to the admission of drug paraphernalia and an 
officer's opinion about marijauna residue on the paraphernalia 
fails because of the officer's expertise and the undemanding 
standard required to authenticate evidence. Defendant fails to 
show either deficient performance or prejudice in his counsel's 
refusal to object to a perfectly adequate cautionary instruction 
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or adequate instructions on *intent." Finally, defendant fails 
to show that his counsel's choice not to request a lesser 
included offense instruction on attempted possession with intent 
to distribute was anything other than legitimate trial strategy. 
PQINT II 
The trial court correctly admitted testimony of defendant's 
prior uncharged drug dealing. The evidence was offered only to 
show defendant's intent to distribute marijuana on the evening of 
his arrest and was highly probative based on the similarity and 
recency of the prior acts. The evidence was also necessary to 
the State's case which was circumstantial and lacked any direct 
evidence of defendant's having actually distributed marijuana on 
the evening in question. While defendant has apparently 
abandoned a challenge to the trial court's overall weighing of 
probative value against unfair prejudice under rule 403, Utah 
Rules of Evidence, such a weighing favors admissibility based on 
the strength of the prior act evidence, the recency of the prior 
acts, and the probability that the jury would not be roused to 
"overmastering hostility" by reference to single instances of 
drug dealing. Finally, the trial court gave an instruction, 
clearly directing the jury on the limited use of the testimony. 
POINT III 
Because defendant fails to marshal the evidence in support 
of the jury's verdict, the Court should not consider his 
insufficiency of evidence claim. 
POINT IV 
Because defendant fails to supply the Court with a 
transcript or any record evidence bearing on the trial court's 
denial of his motion to reduce sentence, the Court must assume 
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that the lower court acted correctly and decline to consider the 
claim on appeal. 
£RGV*P5NT 
POJNT I 
THE RECORD FAILS TO SUPPORT DEPENDANT'S 
NUMEROUS CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL 
A. The frfrw 
In considering an ineffectiveness of counsel claim raised 
for the first time on direct appeal, the standard of review 
applied by* the appellate court is "whether defendant was deprived 
of effective assistance of counsel as a matter of law." State v. 
Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah App. 1993). However, even 
though the Court applies this usually nondeferential standard, 
"appellate review of counselfs performance must be highly 
deferential" to minimize the "temptation . . . to second-guess 
counsel's performance" in hindsight, "on the basis of an 
inanimate record." Id. at 466. 
Since ineffectiveness challenges normally cannot be raised 
on direct appeal, State v. Villarreal. 857 P.2d 949, 953 (Utah 
App. 1993), aff'd. 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995), the Court is 
presented with the threshold question whether it can hear 
defendant's claim on this point. An appellant may bring an 
ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal if there is new counsel on 
appeal and "the trial record is adequate to permit determination 
of the issue." Id. at 953; State v. Humphries. 818 P.2d 1027, 
1029 (Utah 1991). A record is adequate when " [the appellate 
court is] not aware of any evidence or argument which might be 
made that is not now before [the court]." Id. at 1029. 
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Defendant is represented by new counsel on appeal. However, the 
record is adequate to evaluate only some of defendant's claims. 
In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient by identifying specific acts or omissions which, under 
the circumstances of the particular case, demonstrate that 
""counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.'" State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 
1990) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 
S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)). Second, defendant must establish the 
prejudice prong by "affirmatively show[ing] that a reasonable 
probability exists that except for ineffective counsel, the 
result would have been different." State v. Lovell. 758 P.2d 
909, 913 (Utah 1988). "Defendant has the burden of demonstrating 
that counsel's 'performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment,' and that counsel's actions 
were not conscious trial strategy." State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 
170, 174 (Utah App. 1992). 
Defendant's burden is heavy: 
In proving the first prong of the Strickland 
test, the defendant must point to specific 
instances in the record where counsel's 
assistance was inadequate. Strickland. 466 
U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. In so 
doing, the defendant must overcome "a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance." Id. at 689, 104 S. 
Ct. at 2065. "This court will not 
second-guess trial counsel's legitimate 
strategic choices, however flawed those 
choices might appear in retrospect." 
Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 465 (citing Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065; State v. 
Pascual. 804 P.2d 553, 556 (Utah App. 1991)). 
State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994). 
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B. Defendants Claims are Completely Without 
Either Factual or Legal Support 
1. Witnesses Defendant Claims Should have Been Called 
Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective in failing 
to call as witnesses (1) Matt Mandera, (2) defendant's alleged 
employer or work associate and (3) those present at defendant's 
arrest. Appellant's Br. at 12-13, 16-17. However, since 
defendant did not move for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to 
rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,2 wherein defendant 
might have established why counsel did not call certain witnesses 
or what their testimony might have been, there exists no record 
upon which this Court can assess counsel's actions. *[The 
appellate court] may consider an ineffective assistance claim 
only if the record is adequate to permit a decision." State v. 
Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 860 P.2d 
943 (Utah 1993). See Strain. 885 P.2d at 818 ("Counsel might 
have validly determined that trial preparation time would be 
better spent on other avenues more likely to assist defendant."). 
Therefore, the Court cannot address defendant's claims concerning 
counsel's failure to call prospective witnesses. 
2
 Rule 23B is expressly intended to remedy deficiencies in 
the record related to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The rule provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) Grounds for motion; time. A party to an 
appeal in a criminal case may move the court 
to remand the case to the trial court for the 
purpose of entering findings of fact relevant 
to a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. The motion shall be available only 
upon an allegation of facts constituting 
ineffective assistance of counsel not fully 
appearing in the record on appeal. . . . 
Utah R. App. P. 23B. 
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2. Non-objection to paraphernalia 
Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective in failing 
to object on grounds of relevance and foundation to the 
introduction of the paraphernalia found in his apartment. 
Appellant's Br. at 11-12. 
"'Decisions as . . . to what objections to make . . . are 
generally left to the professional judgment of counsel.'" State 
v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987) (citations omitted). 
Rules 401 and 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, collectively 
provide for the admission of "all evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence." Plainly, the discovery of 
paraphernalia in a bag in a closet in defendant's apartment (T. 
96-98) is relevant to a drug distribution charge. Defendant's 
challenge on foundational grounds is similarly hollow. There is 
no dispute about where the paraphernalia was found, and Officer 
Erickson testified, without significant challenge, that he did 
not think that the paraphernalia belonged to anyone other than 
defendant because a visitor would not have hidden those items in 
defendant's closet (T. 105-06). 
3. Non-objection to marijuana residue 
Defendant claims that counsel was ineffective in failing 
to object to testimony that marijuana residue was found on a 
knife and the bowl of a marijuana pipe because there was 
inadequate foundation laid. Appellant's Br. at 13. 
Rule 901, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: "The 
requirement of authentication or identification as a condition 
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to 
11 
support a finding that the matter in question is what its 
proponent claims." "The rule does not erect a particularly high 
hurdle." United States v. Ortiz. 966 F.2d 707, 716 (1st Cir. 
1992), cert, denied, Ortiz v. United States. 506 U.S. 1063, 113 
S. Ct. 1005 (1993) .3 "The rule requires only that the court 
admit evidence if sufficient proof has been introduced so that a 
reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity or 
identification. The rest is up to the jury." 5 Jack B. 
Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinsteinfs Evidence § 901(a) [01] 
at 901-19 (1994). 
Officer Ericksen testified to having received training in 
drug violations and specialized training in visually identifying 
marijuana at the police academy (T. 94, 97). That was sufficient 
foundation for the admission for the officer's testimony that it 
was marijuana residue that he found on the pipe bowl and knife. 
State v. Wiley. 614 So.2d 862, 870 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (police 
officer's visual identification of cocaine sufficient foundation 
for admission of evidence). Even if it was error to admit 
Officer Erickson's testimony, it was harmless considering that a 
marijuana pipe, whose identification and admission as such is 
nowhere challenged, would naturally be stained with the residue 
of the material it was designed to contain. For this reason 
counsel might have considered an objection pointless. See State 
v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989) (finding reasonable 
counsel's strategic decision not to try to exclude conceivably 
3
 Rule 901 is virtually identical to the rule 901, Federal 
Rules of Evidence, from which it is plainly derived. 
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inadmissible child testimony considering that court had made 
reliability findings), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1,990). 
4. Lack of Written Cautionary Instruction 
Prior to trial defendant moved to exclude the testimony of 
three witnesses who had variously smoked and purchased marijuana 
from defendant on prior occasions (R. 50-51; T. 39-56). The 
trial court denied the motion, finding that the evidence, offered 
to prove defendant's intent to distribute at the time of his 
arrest, was more probative than prejudicial (T. 56).4 
Recognizing, however, that there was a clear danger of prejudice, 
the trial ruled that it would caution the jury that the evidence 
was to be considered only on the issue of defendant's intent at 
the time of his arrest and that it would be improper to convict 
him because of any prior uncharged criminal conduct (T. 56). 
When Cody Beaumont, the first of the State's witnesses to 
testify that defendant had previously provided him with 
marijuana, was asked about his prior connections with defendant, 
the trial court cautioned the jury from the bench: 
THE COURT: All right. Ladies and Gentleman, 
you're going to be receiving some information 
during this trial relating to prior acts of 
distribution of controlled substances by the 
defendant. You are instructed that that 
information is only relevant and is only 
being admitted in this case on the issue of 
the defendant's intent with regard to the 
marijuana that was found in his pocket as 
testified to by Mr. Seymour on March 17, 
1994. You're not to use that information or 
consider that evidence in regard to any other 
aspect of the case. 
4
 Defendant's challenge to the substance of the trial court's 
ruling is discussed below. See Appellee's Br. at Point II. 
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You may not find the defendant, Jared 
Kacsuta, guilty of the offenses charged in 
this case based solely on the evidence that 
he may have distributed marijuana in the 
past. The State must proof [sic] beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant intended 
to distribute the marijuana he possessed, if 
any, on March 17th, 1994. Evidence 
indicating that he engaged in such conduct on 
some other occasion may be considered by you 
as evidence of his intent on March 17th, 
1994; however, you may not enter a guilty 
verdict in this case if the State fails to 
prove the elements of the offense or offenses 
charged even if you believe that he may have 
committed a similar crime in the past. 
(T. 123). With that cautionary instruction, the jury heard Cody 
Beaumont, Jerry Perez and Scott Clemmons testify about 
defendant's having previously supplied them with marijuana (T. 
120-134). 
On appeal, defendant argues, without citation to any legal 
authority, that his counsel was ineffective in failing to object 
to the court's instruction, allegedly deficient because it (1) 
was oral instead of written (2) did not clearly identify which 
witnesses it applied to, (3) should have been more complete and 
definitive about how the jury should treat the testimony, (4) did 
not state that past possession of marijuana did not indicate 
future intent to distribute, (5) did not also state that 
defendant has a presumption of innocence and (6) the instruction 
was ambiguous about what the court meant by testimony of 
defendant's intent. Appellant's Br. at 14-15. 
Addressing defendant's claims in serial fashion: (1) 
defendant provides no authority for the view that a cautionary 
instruction is inadequate because it is given orally, rather than 
in written form. State v. Mincy. 838 P.2d 648, 652 n.l (Utah 
App.) (refusing to consider arguments unsupported by legal 
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analysis or authority, citing State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 
1344 (Utah 1984)), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992); (2) 
the instruction and the context in which it was requested 
obviously refer to witnesses that are just about to testify, and 
the jury could not have been misled that the instruction applied 
to all three juveniles called since their testimony went only to 
their prior drug dealings with defendant; (3) defendant fails to 
show how the instruction, plain and simple, was incomplete, thus 
failing on the second prong of Strickland, at the very least; (4) 
defendant's request that the instruction state that past 
possession of drugs does not bear on future intent to distribute, 
i.e., that the instruction was irrelevant, is vacuous; (5) 
defendant provides no legal support for the view that a 
contemporaneous instruction on the presumption of innocence be 
given, Amicone. 684 P.2d at 1344, and fails to show prejudice 
since the trial court gave a written instruction specifically 
directed to the presumption of innocence (R. 106); and (6) 
defendant fails to discuss in any meaningful way how the jury 
could have been confused about "intent," a term of common usage, 
particularly in view of the prosecution's having focussed the 
jury on that issue in opening argument (T. 62). In sum, 
defendant's claims are without merit. 
5. Intent Jury Instruction 
Defendant claims his trial counsel should have requested an 
instruction on "intent to distribute," rather than accepting the 
court's instruction using the general definition of "intent." He 
apparently argues that this error was compounded by the court's 
failure to distinguish in its cautionary instruction whether it 
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was concerned with the intent to possess as opposed to the intent 
to distribute. Appellant's Br. at 15-16. 
Defendant's claim that the jury would have been incapable of 
applying a general definition of intent to the issue of *intent 
to distribute," or that the instructions given were inadequate, 
is unsupported by any clear legal analysis or authority, and 
should be rejected on that account. Amicone. 684 P.2d at 1344. 
Moreover, defendant's claim is patently without merit considering 
the specificity of the instructions.5 Further, the jury's 
finding defendant guilty of possession with intent to distribute 
and acquitting him on the straight possession charge demonstrates 
its ability to discriminate between the intent to distribute and 
the intent to merely possess. 
6. Lesser Included Offense Instruction 
Defendant argues that because there was no evidence that he 
actually distributed marijuana on March 17, 1994, his counsel was 
ineffective in failing to request a lesser included offense 
instruction on attempted possession with intent to distribute. 
Appellant's Br. at 17-18. This claim too fails. 
Defendant acknowledges that "it is not clear in the record 
whether [counsel's failure to request the instruction he argues 
for on appeal] was in fact decided upon as part of Defense's 
trial strategy." Appellant's Br. at 18. The court gave an 
instruction on the lesser included offense of possession of 
marijuana, a class A misdemeanor. Attempted possession with 
5
 Jury instructions on "intent" and definitions of 
"intentionally," "possession," "distribute" and "distributor" 
(Jury Instructions #12, #13 and #14, R. 115-118) are attached at 
Addendum B. 
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intent to distribute is a third degree felony. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-4-102(3) (1995) ("Criminal attempt to commit . . . a 
felony of the second degree is a third degree felony"). 
Considering that there was no evidence that defendant actually 
distributed marijuana on the date of his arrest, counsel might 
very well have thought that defendant stood a better chance of 
being convicted of simple possession, an offense carrying a 
lesser penalty than attempted possession with intent. Indeed, 
counsel practically invited the jury to convict on the simple 
possession charge when he stated: "The possession--really no 
dispute about it" (T. 156). 
In sum, none of defendant's cursory attacks on his trial 
counsel's performance sustain a genuine claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
PQINT H 
CHALLENGES TO THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF 
PRIOR UNCHARGED CRIMINAL CONDUCT FAIL BECAUSE 
THEY WERE NOT PRESERVED AND LACK MERIT 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in admitting 
testimony of his prior uncharged criminal conduct. Specifically, 
defendant claims that the testimony was irrelevant character 
evidence under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. Appellant's 
Br. at 18-21. The facts of the case, however, clearly show that 
evidence of defendant's prior conduct was admitted only for the 
purpose of showing his intent to distribute on the evening of his 
arrest.6 In disjointed fashion, defendant appears also to attack 
the trial court's ruling under rule 403, Utah Rules of Appellate 
6
 The transcript of the hearing on defendant's motion to 
exclude evidence is attached at Addendum C. 
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procedure, but only as to the court's assessment of the State's 
need for evidence of his prior drug distribution activities. 
Appellant's Br. at 23-24. This attack on the trial court's 
finding is refuted by how probative the evidence was of 
defendant's intent to distribute and how crucial it was to the 
State's purely circumstantial case. Defendant also attacks the 
court's ruling on other bases for exclusion referenced in rule 
4 03. Appellant's Br. at 22-23. However, these claims were not 
preserved in the trial court. 
A. Testimony of Defendants Prior Drug Distribution was 
Admissible ynder Eyile 404(b) tP Show Iiitent 
1. The Law 
Rule 4 04(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, reads: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order 
to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b). Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, not 
exclusion. State v. Olsen. 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994). 
See also State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Utah 1982) (rule 
"has syntax at odds with its substance"); State v. O'Neil. 848 
P.2d 694, 700 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 
1993); State v. Morgan. 813 P.2d 1207, 1210 n.4 (Utah App. 1991); 
State v. Jamison. 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1989). Contra 
State v. Shickles. 760 P.2d 291, 295 (Utah 1988) ("evidence of 
other crimes is generally inadmissible"). "Prior bad act 
evidence is only excluded where the sole reason it is being 
offered is to prove bad character or to show that a person acted 
in conformity with that character." Q!Neil. 848 P.2d at 700. 
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"The admission of evidence under Rule 4 04 is a question of 
law that [the appellate court] review[s] for correctness." 
Olsen. 869 P.2d 1004, 1009 (Utah App. 1994) (citing O'Neil. 848 
P.2d at 698). "'However, the trial court's subsidiary factual 
determinations should be given deference by the appellate court 
and only be overruled if they are clearly erroneous.'" Id. 
(quoting O'Neil. at 698-99). 
2. Testimony was Properly Admitted to Show Intent 
On appeal defendant argues that the sole purpose of the 
evidence was to show his bad character and that because he did 
not take the stand, "neither [defendant's] knowledge nor intent 
were at issue." Appellant's Br. at 19. The second assertion, 
that intent was not at issue, is patent nonsense, demonstrated by 
both the prosecutor's and defense counsel's acknowledgments 
during the motion to exclude and in closing that defendant's 
intent was the only issue before the jury (T. 55, 152, 156).7 
The first assertion, that the purpose of the evidence was to 
show defendant's bad character, is without merit. It is settled 
law in Utah that prior convictions or bad acts related to drug 
dealing, if not too remote in time, are admissible to prove 
defendant's intent in later committing a similar offense. See 
State v. Taylor. 818 P.2d 561, 569-71 (Utah App. 1991) (contested 
evidence of identically packaged marijuana was admissible to 
establish the defendant's constructive possession of marijuana 
7
 In pursuing his argument that testimony of his prior drug 
activities was admitted only for the purpose of showing his bad 
character, defendant argues that evidence of conduct may not be 
proved except through prior criminal convictions, citing State v. 
Minnish, 560 P.2d 340 (Utah 1977). Because character was plainly 
not at issue in this case, neither Minnish. nor defendant's 
arguments, are relevant. 
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found in mountain cabin, and citing numerous cases from other 
jurisdictions admitting evidence of prior drug dealings to prove 
intent); O'Neil. 848 P.2d at 700-01 (finding evidence of the 
defendant's prior drug conviction admissible to show his 
knowledge and intent in the present case). 
In this case the State was required to prove that defendant 
had the intent to distribute marijuana. Defendant does not 
challenge the trial court's finding that defendant provided each 
of his three friends with marijuana on separate occasions "within 
a short time span before the date in question" (T. 51). The 
trial court considered the relevance of these facts under the 
broad definition provided in rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence (T. 
50-51).8 Given that unchallenged finding and the breadth of the 
term ''relevance," the trial court was correct in ruling that the 
boys' testimony was relevant to whether defendant had the intent 
to distribute marijuana on March 17. 
In consideration of the prejudice latent in the admission of 
other-crime evidence, however, such evidence must be more than 
merely relevant. "To give meaning to the policy embodied in Rule 
4 04(b), evidence of other crimes must be reasonably necessary and 
highly probative of a material issue." State v. Johnson. 748 
P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1987) (evidence of other crime admissible 
because indirectly probative on the issue of identity). 
8
 Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 401. 
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In Taylor, this Court found under rule 404(b) that evidence 
of identically packaged bags of marijuana and accounting 
materials documenting prior marijuana sales was sufficiently 
probative of the defendant's constructive possession of marijuana 
in the instant case and crucial to State's case, which was based 
only on circumstantial evidence. Taylor. 818 P.2d at 570. 
The prior crime evidence in this case was both highly 
probative and crucial to the State's case in precisely the same 
way as it was in Taylor. All three boys testified that defendant 
had recently developed a connection with them and thereafter, 
within a few weeks before his arrest, provided them with 
marijuana (T. 121, 124, 127, 130, 132). Cody Beaumont testified 
that defendant had supplied him with marijuana within a week 
prior to defendant's arrest (T. 124). Jerry Perez testified that 
defendant and he had smoked marijuana, which defendant provided, 
at work (T. 130). Scott Clemmons testified that defendant had 
sold him an eighth of an ounce of marijuana for $30 to $40 at the 
end of January or the beginning of February (T. 132-33) . 
It appears that defendant was regularly distributing 
relatively small amounts of marijuana to his friends. When 
arrested, defendant was discovered with three baggies of 
marijuana, all containing relatively small amounts of marijuana 
and $58 (T. 74, 83). One of the boys to whom he had earlier 
dealt marijuana, Cody Beaumont, was present at the time of the 
arrest (T. 121). Based on the similarity between defendant's 
past distributions and the scene at the time of defendant's 
arrest, all occurring within a few weeks, the evidence of past 
acts was highly probative on the issue of defendant's intent. 
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Moreover, the evidence was crucial to the State's case, 
which, as the prosecutor pointed out, was purely circumstantial: 
when defendant was arrested there was a group of six people, four 
of whom were juveniles in his apartment, watching television or 
playing Nintendo (T. 71, 122); defendant had some money and three 
baggies with small and differing amounts of marijuana in his 
pockets (T. 41); various paraphernalia related to smoking 
marijuana and scales were found in defendant's closet (T. 96-98); 
however, there was some evidence that the scales belonged to 
someone else;9 a police officer testified that the discovery of 
multiple baggies of marijuana indicated drug distribution (T. 
13 6); another police officer who returned to the apartment after 
defendant had been arrested testified that WI felt that there 
could have been some stale marijuana smoke in there" (T. 109-10); 
and a neighbor testified that there was frequent traffic at all 
hours of the night into the apartment and that he frequently 
smelled marijuana in the hallways (T. 115-18) . 
While suggestive, this evidence lacked a critical component, 
to wit: testimony or definitive evidence that defendant had 
actually distributed marijuana on the occasion of his arrest. In 
fact, Cody Beaumont, the only witness the State called who was 
among the group of visitors in defendant's apartment, testified 
that defendant had not distributed any marijuana on the evening 
of March 17. Plainly, the State needed evidence of defendant's 
distribution activities to convince a jury that what might be a 
9
 Officer Erickson testified that a Matt Mandera, also among 
the group in the apartment when defendant was arrested, said that 
the scales belonged to him. This statement by the police officer 
was excluded as hearsay (T. 103). 
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drug distribution scenario in fact was. Testimony of defendant's 
past activities supplied that missing ingredient. In sum, the 
trial court was correct in finding the challenged testimony 
admissible under rule 404(b). 
B. Defendant's Claim That the State Had Adequate 
Alternative Evidence Fails 
At trial the prosecutor proposed that in evaluating 
defendant's claim under rule 4 03,10 that the court consider 
applying the test used in State v. Morrell. 803 P.2d 292 (Utah 
App. 1990). That test, announced in State v. Shickles. 760 P.2d 
291, 295-96 (Utah 1988), listed a number of factors useful in 
determining the admissibility of evidence under rule 403.1X On 
10 Rule 4 03, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if 
its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 403 
11
 This is the test: 
In deciding whether the danger of unfair 
prejudice and the like substantially out-
weighs the incremental probative value, a 
variety of matters must be considered, 
including [1] the strength of the evidence 
as to the commission of the other crime, [2] 
the similarities between the crimes, [3] the 
interval of time that has elapsed between 
the crimes, [4] the need for the evidence, 
[5] the efficacy of alternative proof, and 
[6] the degree to which the evidence probably 
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appeal, however, defendant has apparently abandoned any challenge 
to the trial court's overall assessment that the evidence was 
more probative than prejudicial, attacking only the court's 
implicit finding that the evidence was admissible, in part, 
because it was crucial to the State's purely circumstantial 
case.12 Appellant's Br. at 23-24. The sufficiency of the trial 
court's ruling on this point has been discussed, above. See 
Appellee's Br. at 20-23 . 
Even if this Court were to consider the trial court's 
ultimate conclusion that the testimony of the three boys was 
admissible under rule 403, applying the facts to the remaining 
Shickles factors, it should uphold the court's ruling. The 
strength of the evidence of defendant's prior dealings is based 
on the eyewitness testimony of each participant in the prior drug 
transaction, the truth of which trial counsel never attempted to 
dispute. State v. Cauble. 563 P.2d 775, 778-79 (Utah 1977) 
(admitting evidence of prior crimes for which the defendant had 
not been convicted to show intent). The time interval between 
defendant's prior drug transactions and the instant offense 
ranged from one week to at most a month and a half. O'Neil, 848 
will rouse the jury to overmastering hostil-
ity. 
Shickles. 760 P.2d at 295. 
12
 Although the trial court did not make an explicit finding 
on this point, it is clear that the court incorporated such a 
finding in its ruling. The prosecutor very deliberately argued 
the State's need to show defendant's intent to distribute through 
his prior acts (T. 41-42) , and the trial court inquired about 
whether the State had alternative evidence (T. 54), to which the 
prosecutor responded (T. 54-55). 
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P.2d at 701 (evidence of conviction three years previous not 
excessive); Morrell. 803 P.2d at 296 (evidence of robbery one 
month prior properly admitted). The jury would not likely have 
been roused to "overmastering hostility" by the admission of the 
challenged testimony. O'Neil. 848 P.2d at "/jl (this Court 
refused to believe "that the jury was roused to 'overmastering 
hostility' based on a simple drug distribution charge"). 
Finally, any danger of unfair prejudice was diffused by the trial 
court's instruction to the jury, given immediately before the 
boys' testimony. The court very clearly cautioned the jury about 
the limited purpose for which they could use evidence of 
defendant's prior drug dealing and admonished them that they 
could not find defendant guilty of the charged offense if the 
State had failed to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, even if 
they believed he had committed similar crimes in the past (T. 
123). Based on these facts, the court's admission of testimony 
of defendant's past drug distributions under rule 403 was 
reasonable. Olsen. 869 P.2d at 1009 ("A trial court's ruling 
based on Rule 403 will not be reversed unless its decision w'was 
beyond the limits of reasonability"'") (quoting O'Neil. 84 8 P.2d 
at 699, quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 
1992)) . 
C. Failure tQ Preserve Claims for Appeal* 
11
 [Ordinarily, [the reviewing court] will not entertain an 
issue first raised on appeal in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances or plain error." State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 
1311 (Utah 1987); State v. Price. 837 P.2d 578, 580-01 (Utah App. 
1992). "The trial court is considered fthe proper forum in which 
to commence thoughtful and probing analysis1 of issues." State 
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v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359-60 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting State v. 
%Qh, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990)). * [To ensure the 
trial court's opportunity to consider an issue, appellate review 
of criminal cases in Utah requires that "'some form of specific 
preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial 
court record before an appellate court will review such claim on 
appeal."' State v. Ranag. 866 P.2d 607, 611 (Utah App. 1993) 
(quoting State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989)); 
accord State v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987)." State 
v. Pilling. 875 P.2d 604, 606-07 (Utah App. 1994). 
Defendant's motion to exclude evidence was plainly grounded 
only on a claim of unfair prejudice stemming from expected 
testimony of prior uncharged criminal conduct under rule 4 04(b), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (R. 50-51; T. 40-44). Defendant 
acknowledges that the trial court ruled based on its weighing of 
probative value versus unfair prejudice under rule 403, Utah 
Rules of Evidence. Appellant's Br. at 21. However, on appeal 
defendant claims trial court error based on the other grounds 
provided for in the rule, i.e., confusion of the issues, 
misleading the jury and needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. Appellant's Br. at 21. None of these alternative 
bases for excluding otherwise relevant evidence, presented at 
Appellant's Br. at 22-23, points 1-3, was argued to the trial 
court, and, therefore, they are waived on appeal. Further, 
defendant has neither argued plain error nor circumstances. 
Therefore, the Court should refuse to consider them.13 
13
 Even if this Court should consider defendant's ancillary 
claims, Appellant's Br. at 22-23, it would find them without merit. 
Points 1 and 2 are a rehash of defendant's challenge to the court's 
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POINT ITI 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE AS A 
PREDICATE TO CHALLENGING THE SUFFICIENCY OF 
THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS CONVICTION 
In order to successfully challenge the juryfs verdict the 
reviewing court must find that the evidence and its inferences 
are so "inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Petree. 
659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), superseded by rule on other 
grounds. Stfrte v, Wfllkey, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). . In 
undertaking such review, the appellate court will "view the 
evidence, along with the reasonable inferences from it, in the 
light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 
732, 738 (Utah App. 1990) (citation omitted). "[So long as some 
evidence and reasonable inferences support the juryfs findings, 
we will not disturb them. See State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 345 
(Utah 1985)." Ibid-
To meet this burden, defendant must marshal all the evidence 
in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that even viewing 
it in the light most favorable to the court below, the evidence 
is insufficient to support the verdict. Failure to so marshal 
the evidence waives an appellant's right to have his claim of 
cautionary instruction, and are rebutted above. Appellee's Br. at 
13-15. Point 3 asserts that the court erred in failing to give the 
jury an instruction on how remote evidence should be weighed. 
Appellant's Br. at 23. Defendant provides no authority undermining 
the trial court's implicit finding that Jerry Perez's and Cody 
Beaumont's smoking marijuana provided by defendant only one or two 
weeks prior to defendant's arrest was not remote. Further, the 
court buttressed its finding in noting that Cody Beaumont was 
present when defendant was arrested (T. 53). 
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insufficiency considered on appeal. Mincy, 838 P.2d at 652 n.l 
(citing Moore. 802 P.2d at 738-39). 
In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant 
argues: that Cody Beaumont, the only person present at the time 
of defendant's arrest and who testified at trial, did not know 
that defendant was in possession of marijuana; that Matt Mandera 
told investigating officers that he owned the scales found in the 
apartment; that the baggies contained only small, uneven amounts 
of marijuana; that defendant's prior drug transactions took place 
two and three weeks prior and that the search of the apartment 
was not based on reasonable suspicion or carried out with a 
search warrant. 
Plainly, defendant has not marshaled any evidence in support 
of the jury's verdict, and this Court should decline to consider 
his claim of insufficient evidence on that ground alone. Indeed, 
much of the evidence he offers in rebuttal is either irrelevant 
to the analysis or insufficiently set out. Particularly, 
evidence that Mandera owned the scales was stricken on the 
State's hearsay objection (T. 103). Officer Goodwin testified 
that the discovery of multiple baggies indicated that the 
marijuana was for distribution and that the small and various 
amounts might well have resulted from the common practice of 
"pinching," i.e., taking some of the packaged product for 
personal use (T. 137-38). Cody Beaumont testified that he had 
smoked marijuana provided by defendant within only one week prior 
to defendant's arrest (T. 124). 
In sum, not only has defendant failed to marshal the 
evidence, he has also inaccurately set out evidence in support of 
his claim. Further, based on the facts presented to the jury, 
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Appellee's Br, at 3-6, there was sufficient evidence to support 
the jury's verdict. 
PQINT XV 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO SUPPLY AN ADEQUATE 
RECORD ON APPEAL TO PERMIT ASSESSMENT OF THE 
TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO REDUCE DEFENDANT'S 
JUDGMENT 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in refusing to 
grant his motion to reduce his sentence. Appellant's Br. at 25-
26. However, the lack of an adequate record prevents this Court 
from considering defendant's claim. 
The Utah Supreme Court has often refused to consider claims 
founded on an inadequate record. See Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 
1148, 1150 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 1033, 110 S. Ct. 
751 (1990); State v. Steggell. 660 P.2d 252, 253 (Utah 1983). In 
State v. Garza, this Court similarly refused to consider a 
defendant's appeal from the denial of her motion to suppress 
where she had failed to supply the Court with a transcript of the 
hearing on the motion to suppress. State v. Garza, 820 P.2d 937, 
938 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). 
The Court's decision was bolstered by the defendant's failure to 
include a statement of facts in her brief. Id. at 939. The 
Court held that without an adequate record uwe must assume, as a 
matter of law, that the trial court's decision was not 
erroneous." Id. at 938. 
The same circumstances pertain in this case. Defendant 
moved for a reduction of his sentence following trial (R. 150). 
The motion fails to mention any grounds in support of the 
request. Evidently, the motion was heard and denied on July 19, 
1994; however the minute entry fails to disclose the grounds for 
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the trial court's ruling (R. 149). The record is devoid of 
anything that could assist this Court in reviewing the trial 
court's ruling. Moreover, defendant has failed to cite any part 
of the record that would support his claim. Indeed, his 
factually unsupported argument is similarly unsupported by any 
legal authority. Ami cone. 684 P.2d at 1344. Therefore, because 
defendant has failed to provide any record that would allow this 
Court to meaningfully review the trial court's ruling, the Court 
should decline to consider his claim. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED 
Based on this Court's prior development of the issues raised 
in this case, th§ State does not request oral argument. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this >? day of February, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except 
as otherwise provided by the Constitution of 
the United States or the Constitution of the 
state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or 
by other rules applicable in courts of this 
state. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible. 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person 
in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for 
other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
Rule 901, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(a) General provision. The requirement of 
authentication or identification as a 
condition precedent to admissibility is 
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support 
finding that the matter in question is what 
its proponent claims. 
Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
(a) Grounds for motion; time. A party to an 
appeal in a criminal case may move the court 
to remand the case to the trial court for the 
purpose of entering findings of fact relevant 
to a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. The motion shall be available only 
upon an allegation of facts constituting 
ineffective assistance of counsel not fully 
appearing in the record on appeal. The 
motion shall be filed prior to the filing of 
the appellant's brief. Upon a showing of 
good cause, the court may permit a motion to 
be filed after the filing of the appellant's 
brief. In no event shall the court permit a 
motion to be filed after oral argument. 
Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court 
from remanding the case under this rule on 
its own motion at any time if the claim has 
been raised and the motion would have been 
available to a party. 
ADDENDUM B 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Another person's intent, being a state of mind, is seldom 
susceptible of proof by direct and positive evidence and must 
ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, statements and 
circumstances. You are the final judges as to the person's actual 
intent as shown by these factors. 
INSTRUCTION NO, 1 3 
In every crime or public offense there must be a union or joint operation of the 
act and intent. The intent or intention is manifest by the circumstances connected with the 
offense and the sound mind and discretion of the accused. 
A person is only guilty of an offense when his conduct is prohibited by law and 
he acts with some kind of criminal intent, that is, he acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly 
as the definition of the offense requires. 
••Distribute" means to deliver other than by 
administering or dispensing a controlled 
substance or a listed chemical. 
"Distributor" means a person who distributes 
controlled substances. 
INSTRUCTION NO. \3~ 
In these instructions certain words and phrases are used 
which require definitions so that you may properly understand the 
nature of the crime charged and apply the law as contained in these 
instructions to the facts as you may find them from the evidence. 
These definitions are as follows: 
A person engages in conduct "intentionally or with 
intent11 or willfully with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his 
conscious objective or desire to engage in conduct or 
cause the results. 
A person engages in conduct "knowingly, or with 
knowledge" with respect to his conduct or to the 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of 
the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. 
A person acts "knowingly, or with knowledge" with respect 
to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
"Possession" means the joint or individual ownership, 
control, holding, retaining, maintaining, or obtaining of 
controlled substances, and includes individual, joint or 
group possession of controlled substances. For a person 
to be a possessor of a controlled substance, it is not 
c~required that he be shown to have individually possessed, 
*D *y%or controlled the substance, but it is sufficient if J&ULL^ 
^vidau^ct. i^ shows that he jointly participated with one or more 
persons in the possession or control of any substances 
with knowledge that the activity was occurring. 
You are instructed that marijuana is a controlled 
substance under Utah law. ^ ^,* 
You are instructed that one ounce equals SVBStiSS? grams 
ADDENDUM C 
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1 closed, we'll appreciate that. 
2 We'll be in recess* 
3 Counsel, can I see you in chambers briefly. 
4 (Whereupon, a recess was taken.) 
5 (Whereupon, a discussion was had among Court 
6 and counsel in chambers out of the hearing of 
7 the jury, which was reported as follows:) 
8 THE COURT: Let's go on the record. We're 
9 convened in chambers. It's now two minutes after 11:00. 
10 Present are myself, the court reporter, the clerk, the 
11 transportation officer with the defendant Mr. Kacsuta. 
12 Also defense counsel, Mr. Christiansen, and counsel for the 
13 State, Mr. Kanell. 
14 The purpose of our meeting in chambers and out 
15 of the presence of the jury and witnesses is to discuss a 
16 motion which was made yesterday by Mr. Christiansen to 
17 exclude certain portions of the State's intended evidence. 
18 And that relates to evidence of prior criminal activity 
19 which is uncharged in this case. We discussed it briefly 
20 yesterday, and I said I would treat it as a Motion in 
21 Limine. And Mr. Kanell has asked that we resolve that 
22 before he makes his opening statement to the jury, which 
23 we're about to hear. 
24 I'll hear any evidence or argument — any 
25 arguments you wish to present at this juncture on whether 
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1 or not that evidence should be excluded. 
2 MR, CHRISTIANSEN: Well, I suppose that it's my 
3 motion, and so I'll begin• I really don't have anything to 
4 add from yesterday. The general rule seems to be — as 
5 pointed out in my memorandum — that evidence of other 
6 crimes is not admissible. Granted, there are exceptions. 
7 And as the Court pointed out yesterday, even in the Rules 
8 of Evidence, the — the matter of intent can be an 
9 exception. But I think that the reason to apply the 
10 exception has to be clearly made. The reason for the rule 
11 is that if the jury hears of other misconduct, then they 
12 might acquire the concept that the defendant is a — a 
13 lawless type person, and whether he's guilty of the thing 
14 he's being tried of today or not, he's guilty of something, 
15 so we better take this opportunity to — to find him guilty 
16 of something so the Court can punish him. So I think that 
17 this — they could be prejudicial. 
18 And the reason for them — for admitting them 
19 has to be strongly relevant, I think. And in the cases 
20 that I anticipate in this case — the Clemmons case, the 
21 Perez, the Beaumont boy — whoever — people who may have 
22 supposedly smoked with — marijuana with the defendant on 
23 some prior indications, doesn't really indicate that he's 
24 in the — in the business of distributing. And certainly 
25 it doesn't apply to the marijuana that was found on his 
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1 person. And so all that they — they would be would be 
2 prejudicial against him. And you're right. It would not 
3 show anything affirmative that would be worthwhile. 
4 Thank you. 
5 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Kanell? 
6 MR. KANELL: I think the first question is is 
7 the evidence relevant. And I think in this case, it's 
8 clearly relevant. 
9 And the second, the evidence is — the second — 
10 THE COURT: Just so the record is clear maybe 
11 you can tell us what evidence we're talking about and why 
12 you feel it's relevant. 
13 MR. KANELL: Okay. I would like to state the 
14 specific evidence that I understand, and the way it's going 
15 to come in. 
16 Count I that's charged ~ the State has the 
17 burden of proving the element that the defendant had the 
18 intent to distribute the marijuana. And that's a fairly 
19 difficult thing to prove, because evidence of a person's 
20 state of mind is kind of difficult to prove. But evidence 
21 that we have that would show that is that he was 
22 unemployed, and he had some money in his — in his pocket, 
23 and that he had three baggies of marijuana containing 
24 various quantities of marijuana in each baggie. And 
25 that's — I don't think there's any problem admitting 
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1 that. That's clearly relevant and admissible. 
2 But then we also would have evidence from his 
3 neighbor that there was a lot of traffic going back and 
4 forth from his apartment, and that — I'm not sure. He may 
5 testify that at times, he smelled the odor of marijuana 
6 coming out of the apartment* And he testified that he 
7 complained to the landlord about the traffic. I think 
8 that's relevant and admissible. And it does have something 
9 to do with the intent to distribute, with people coming to 
10 the apartment. 
11 The evidence that we're dealing with now, I 
12 think, is evidence that will come from Scott Clemmons, Cody 
13 Beaumont and Jerry Perez. I think they each will testify 
14 that they understood that the defendant was in the business 
15 of distributing marijuana either for money or for 
16 friendship with his friends. He provided marijuana and 
17 allowed them to smoke it, or he sold them marijuana. And 
18 that — those are, of course, evidence that his prior bad 
19 act that is a crime if it were proven — that it is an 
20 uncharged crime, because we haven't had the actual drugs 
21 that were involved or the ability to charge those. 
22 And the reason that we need to ~ to present 
23 that evidence is because that's our basic theory of the 
24 case, is that the defendant was basically running a 
25 business — an operation where he was selling marijuana, 
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and he was distributing it to friends. That's our basic 
theory of the case. 
And as I said before, in analyzing that 
evidence, the first question is whether that would be 
relevant. And I think it's clearly relevant to our theory 
of the case. The second is it's also clearly evidence 
of — of prior bad acts, fcrtiich if it were entered just to 
show that the defendant is a bad person because he's done 
bad acts, or he has a bad character so he should be guilty, 
then that would be improper. But we would specifically be 
offering the evidence under Rule 404(b), that it's evidence 
of his state of mind and his intent that he had marijuana 
and — and intended to distribute it. 
And once — if the Court rules that that is 
evidence of his intent, then the Court has to go to Rule 
403, which is the rule dealing with a balancing of 
interest, to decide whether the relevance of the-evidende 
outweighs the possibility that the evidence will prejudice 
the jury and make them hostile towards the defendant, or in 
other words, that the prejudice over — outweighs the 
relevance. 
I think it's the State's burden to prove that 
it's relevant and to prove that it's evidence of intent, 
and that then when the judge makes that balancing act, I 
think that the judge — it's the defense's burden to show 
PATTT CI M n M T T T T T X T 
1 that it would create hostile — or that the prejudice would 
2 outweigh the relevance. 
3 That's the way I understand the law. And — 
4 THE COURT: All right. 
5 MR. KANELL: And in the state of — in the case 
6 of State of Utah versus Kenneth James fforrell, the Court of 
7 Appeals analyzed Rule^04(Jb) with that regard, and they — 
8 they listed factors that are helpful in balancing 
9 probativeness and prejudice. And it says that the — in 
10 deciding whether the danger of unfair prejudice in a case 
11 substantially outweighs the incremental probative value, a 
12 variety of matters must be considered, including the 
13 strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other 
14 crime, the similarities between the crimes, the interval of 
15 time that has elapsed between the crimes, a need for the 
16 evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof and the degree 
17 to which the evidence probably will arouse the jury to 
18 overmastering hostility. 
19 And then it goes on to say that in that 
20 particular case, they decided that the State had a great 
21 need to present the evidence to demonstrate intent and how 
22 effective alternative proof was available. And that would 
23 deal with the — with the two types of robberies that were 
24 almost identical fact situations, so it was — that was 
25 good evidence of intent in that particular case. And we 
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feel that that evidence is critical to our case. It shows 
his intent. 
And, in fact, there's another analysis under 
Bule 404(b) that has to do with the doctrine of chances. 
And I think that's relevant to us. In other words, if the 
defendant is going to argue that this is just personal use, 
we would argue that he's had marijuana so many times in the 
past that he's distributed and — to others, that to say 
"Well, this one time he just was going to do it for 
personal use" —- we feel that that evidence is important to 
contradict that to show that it's unlikely, because the 
probability of — that he was going to use this for 
personal use, when he's always distributed it in the past, 
is unlikely. 
THE COURT: Any response, Mr. Christiansen? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Yes. On the matter of 
relevance, Your Honor, I don't feel that any of the items 
mentioned by Mr. Kanell show that this evidence is 
relevant. The fact that he — that the defendant was 
unemployed and had $58 or some amount in his pocket — 
unemployed people still have to eat. I don't think that he 
has some money in his pocket means anything. It just means 
that he's not totally broke. And certainly it means even 
with that amount, that that — that doesn't justify a — a 
drug business. Because the drug business produces greater 
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1 amounts of money than that. If that's to be considered 
2 that way. 
3 The other is that in these three bags, they had 
4 different quantities. And I guess I interpreted that 
5 different than Mr. Kanell, but I would think that if these 
6 bags are packaged for sale, that they would have the same 
7 amount in them. I think one of them, the evidence would 
8 show, had point four of a gram. And then it went from 
9 there up to four plus grams, I believe it was. And if he's 
10 going to have it for sale, the — the amounts would be the 
11 same. And I think this indicates that these are just bags 
12 that he used for his own purpose. He'd taken some out of 
13 one and some out of another. 
14 And then I think the fact that there is such a 
15 small amount here — considering all three bags together, 
16 there's such a small amount. That — that if he's in the 
17 business of distributing, that he would have more than 
18 that. So I think the small amount indicates, then, an 
19 irrelevance. 
20 Well — and again, I won't repeat what I've said 
21 about the prejudicial part of it. I think that part is — 
22 THE COURT: All right. 
23 MR. KACSUTA: Sir. May I say something? 
24 THE COURT: You can talk to your attorney, 
25 Mr. Kacsuta. I can't discuss anything with you. 
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(Discussion off the record,) 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Well, unemployment may be a 
part of — what he's saying is the unemployment may be a 
fact in dispute. Personally, I don't see that it's a fact 
at all, where he has $58 in his pocket. I also mentioned 
that it did not have any probative value at all whether 
he's employed or unemployed. 
THE COURT: Well, just so I'm clear, 
Mr. Christiansen, is it your motion to exclude the 
witnesses only of — the testimony of the three witnesses 
who are going to testify about prior distributions by 
Mr. Kacsuta? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Yes. Those three. If that's 
all that they're going to be using. 
THE COURT: So you didn't — you're not moving 
to suppress the evidence about the $58, are you? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Also, Mr. Kanell, you said 
something about having your witnesses testify that they 
understood that Mr. Kacsuta was involved in drug 
distributions. 
MR. KANELL: Well ~ 
THE COURT: That seems to — 
MR. KANELL: It started out with Mr. Clemmons. 
I said — you know, I asked "Do you use marijuana? 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
1 MYes. 
2 "During the time around March 17th of — of 
3 1994, did you know where you could obtain marijuana? 
4 "Yes. 
5 "Who could you obtain it from?" 
6 And he mentions the defendant and a couple other 
7 people who — the defendant# his brother, and another 
8 friend. 
9 All three of those people were in the apartment 
10 at the time the officers came. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. Is that the way you intend to 
12 ask the question? 
13 MR. KANELL: Yes. 
14 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Well, I'd object to that as 
15 being hearsay, anyway. 
16 MR. KANELL: Based upon his knowledge of where 
17 he could obtain marijuana. 
18 And then I would like to ask him "How do you 
19 know that?" And he will say, "Well, I purchased marijuana 
20 from Jared Kacsuta." 
21 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Christiansen, do you 
22 want to respond to that issue? It's a slightly different 
23 issue, it seems to me. His testimony about his — his 
24 purchase of marijuana from Mr. Kacsuta &eferly *omes within 
25 the rule under 404(b). His statements of what he 
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1 understood the reputat ion of Mr. Kacsuta cu L 
2 i i i f I e t i-11 in1!1 iih 11 i u r . 
3 KRm KANELL: well, I don't think it's a 
4 a — his personal knowledge of 
5 iere r>e could buy marijuana. 
THE f™ saying 
that WP need to analyze that highly differently than we did 
about his actual purchasing, PCIIISI 11 
i'. iiie „ it lias to <lo more with -his reputation, 
10 character,. Those are the kind of analyses " 
zu 
K- CHRISTIANSEN: C £ course evidence of 
elieve . inadmissible. °~ '* 
we're talking about character, II id be inadmissible. 
THE COURT" '" , .'I all/. 
Nik11, KANELL1. I t ' s the same I s sue , 1L goes Lo 
i l l s i n t e n t . 
THE COURT: T ' — ^our pardon? 
MR. KANELL :t goes to t h e defendai • '" in ' r ' i l , 
111 "111 oil Hi »" veuh. Bun t then a r e n ' t ^uu r e a l l y 
t a l k i n g about h i s character He's been a rinirj d e a l e r i n 
1, 1 1 c i> f iM „ ) ( 1 i 1.1 In, (, i i I ling to 
drugs here. And that really is his character rather 
actual • 
MR. KANELL: "r# *- offering it for his 
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character, I'm just offering it for the fact that he — his 
intent at the time was that he was going to distribute 
drugs. 
THE COURT: And I think evidence by an 
individual that they had, in fact, purchased drugs close in 
time to the ~ to the time of the possession has some 
relevance on that. I'm not sure that their opinion of his 
general character or his general involvement in the drug 
trafficking trade fits into the same category, from an 
analytical point of view. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: I think another matter, Your 
Honor, is that this charge would be possession of — of 
this marijuana with intent to distribute this marijuana. 
And the small amount that he has. If we're talking about 
an instance two or three weeks before that, it seems to me 
that it doesn't indicate an intent to distribute this small 
amount. He may have had another amount, but I think where 
the amount was so small, the — well, there is no 
carry-over. 
THE COURT: Well, let me first — let me rule on 
the matter. 
The first question I agree with Mr. Kanell is 
the question of :T«lSR%aic§. And under 461, £ "relevant 
evidence11 means evidence tiaving any tendency to make the 
existence of any ~fafct that Is of consequence to the 
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d e t e r m i n e I Inn nl I In i'u I n HI IIII HI |H nl< i l l I HI I 
than i_ would be without the evidence . 
|H i h i l l ' 11 
and certainly the evidence from other persons that they had 
',,',11,11, ,', f,l, M I mi: • | -,i, Iffmr Mn1 '•'vt-r MI question 
purchased or obtained marijuana from Mr. Kacsuta is 
relevant. It — it certainly raises a clear or hv-< a 
clear relationship to the issues in this case as tu wtial. 
his intent was in possessing that marijuana on March 17th. 
sn thp relevance, I think, is clearly shown. 
Under 404 (b), the State is entitled to introduce 
It's not precluded by the Rules of Evidence. It's not 
precluded by the general rule th Christiansen cited 
in his motion yesterday. But thert a process of 
balancing which the Court must go through to determine 
whether this otherwise .olevant evidence should be 
admissible evidence ^nd that's where the real difficulty 
>mes in. 
Because undoubtedly, when you introduce before a 
charged with the responsibili / oi determining 
whether the defendant intended to distribute the marijuana 
that he possessed evidence that he has on three different 
occasions prior to that distributed marijuana to other 
persons, there's a clear danger that their focus will be 
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shifted from ±he crime that they're considering here today 
to the crimes that the State claims he committed but are 
not charged in this event — in this case. So there's — 
there's always the possibility of unfair prejudice to the 
defendant under these kinds of circumstances. 
The question is whether or not that unfair 
prejudice is outweighed by the probative value of the 
evidence. And I think to determine that, you have to 
analyze each item of evidence separately and then look at 
those items collectively as they relate to the issue. 
For example, the testimony of the witness who 
testified — who is going to testify, as I understand it 
from what we — was said yesterday, that he had purchased 
marijuana two to three weeks before March 1.7th "from 
Mr. Kacsuta. If that were the only testimony the State 
were seeking to introduce, I would probably find that its 
probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice to the defendant, standing alone. The time is of 
some concern, two to three weeks. It's unsupported by any 
other evidence. Obviously it has some probative value, but 
not a lot as to what Mr. Kacsuta intended to do on March 
17th with the marijuana in his pocket. But it does not 
stand alone in these — in this case. We have Mr. Perez, 
who is going to testify what, Mr. Kanell? 
MR. KANELL: I think it's around one or two 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
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weeks before, i Kacsuta provided him with marijuana. $md 
they .smoked it together, 
COURT: Okay. So r 
two weeks before March 17th, »r rvacsutc 
ui i i i involved in distributing is4 :bating marijuana. 
And we have two ^ r s, ^u testify. 
And tuwu ~~ * - K- Beaumont. 
MR. KANELI .c iy Beaumont, He was ii i the 
apartme March the 17th. He had just 
barely gotten there, and he had — >•• im.ii n in 
defendant had provided in the pas1 , hv \ I think 
r *• |rs one 01: two weeks. 
THE COURT: right. So have three 
different persons w> * iJiree-week 
period before March 17th, Mr* Kacsuta had distributed 
marijuana has ~ is clearly 
clearly highly probative of Mi Kacsuta's intent o.. II.' 
c especially where * - lose individuals 
is presen~ , t apartment with other peuj . n 
this arrest oc^r- and the -- and the marijuana is found 
in M r . Va^eiyfc* 
It' close process ~ determining whether +** 
anfair prejuc probative value, 
the final step, think, is to look ...i, the State's r 
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1 the evidence and the availability of alternative proof to 
2 establish the defendant's intent. 
3 What alternative proof do you have to show his 
4 intent? 
5 MR. KANELL: Well, the alternative proof that we 
6 have is the fact that he had some money on his person. It 
7 could have been used -- he could have collected it from the 
8 people in the apartment and is — when they were all 
9 sharing the marijuana. Or were going to. He — there had 
10 been complaints to the landlord. There had been foot 
11 traffic — traffic *-- frequent foot traffic going to that. 
12 And that's all we have as alternative evidence. 
13 THE COURT: The normal process — or the normal 
14 way that one proves the intent to distribute is to call an 
15 expert witness and have them testify as to the amount and 
16 the packaging and those kinds of items. 
17 Do you have any such evidence in this case? 
18 MR. KANELL: Raymond Goodwin is willing to 
19 testify as an expert witness about the packing amounts, 
20 foot traffic, and that those things are indicative of 
21 distributing drugs. 
22 THE COURT: So you do have an effective 
23 alternative means? 
24 MR. KANELL: I don't know if it's effective. 
25 It's — it's additional. It's part of it. 
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THE I 1111 II1 I , lu his testimony goinn *•« K^ *Kat 
one who possesses a small quantity of marijuana divided up 
three uneven bags is indicative I" itie intent to 
distribute? 
I 
difficult, . f testify is -z when 
distributing. The amounts somewhat troubling, 
but he's goinc „u testify that often e 
distributing, they're -^'-^hing amount themselves or 
taking part ^r* * *-• * ~ , a^u F<~ UWUGXJ.^ 
mounts *n* wni _ ^rrerent. 
I mean that's u^- they're going 
to distribute it, it they would all be quarter ounce 
baggies 
THE COURri -- . - ear on the record, 
Mr. Christiansen, you agree that the intent OL uie 
defendant with regai. *e marijuana that was found in 
lis pocket is the-pivotal issue in this case; is that 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Yi".., li I he first ur.m Il 
u n a w s s
 U X r o e . J t c h a n g e s iiiiiiii i in i .rlmmi-Mii in I n i I  i 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: x think just 
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1 him and such small distributions as that may not really be 
2 relevant of the type of intent the statute is talking 
3 about. 
4 THE COURT: Well, I think that's exactly what it 
5 is relevant to. I think that the statute prohibits sharing 
6 marijuana with your friends even if it is in small 
7 amounts. And it doesn't have to be distributed for value; 
8 it doesn't have to be distributed for any ~ in any 
9 particular quantity. Distribution includes giving it away 
10 or allowing somebody to take a hit off your cigarette just 
11 as surely as it does selling a brick of marijuana. So I 
12 think there's relevance. 
13 Well, I'm going to determine and I do determine 
14 that although there is clear danger of unfair prejudice, 
15 that the probative value of the evidence outweighs that ~— 
16 that danger. But I do intend to instruct the jury that 
17 they are to regard any evidence of prior illegal conduct 
18 only as it relates to the intent of the defendant on the — 
19 on the day charged. And I'm also going to caution them 
20 that it will be totally improper for them to find him 
21 guilty of the offense with which he's charged just because 
22 they may believe that he may have committed that offense in 
23 the past and was not charged. 
24 Do you understand that? 
25 MR. KANELL: Yes. 
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<6V 
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THE COURT: e~ T " 
i 11 i I" it cautionary instruction,. 
And T* LI ULA, HI Kane 1J 1 
instruction for me to give to the jury at you 
intend to produce this evidence, okay? 
MR. KANELL: Okay. 
'in 1 ( I'i>iin INI 1  il IK 111 iiiiivi h i e l s e we need 
I o decide? And with regard to the testimony ^ the 
mi 1 1 e MI r — their .knowledge x>r their opinion 
that Mr, Kacsuta was involved in the drug trafficking, 
11I'I nt-the motion to suppress that evidence. So 
would be improper for you t« **' 
an opinion opinion tha *. • salesman. 
U A / 
relate t ntent 1 stribute marijuana and 
u Q Whether lie 
a drug 
Anythina ^x&c we need to discuss at this 
point? 
i s s u e 
wi th th-. 
MR. KANELI 
THE COURT: 
:: . a l ? 
M R , . K A N E L I ,1 
in i l l i ml In mi m i in i mi in1,,,11 I n . 
Have we s u f f i c i e n t l y c l a r i f i e d w~ 
statements and proceed 
I think s o , Your Honor. 
PATTT.fJ MrMULLTN 
